A
CRITICAL STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
IN INDIA –WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
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A SYNOPSIS
By K P C Rao.,
LL.B., FCS., FCMA.
Practicing Company Secretary,
kpcrao.india@gmail.com
kpcrao.india@gmail.com
I. INTRODUCTION
Nature of Indian Polity
The preamble to the
constitution of India lays down as under:
WE,
THE PEOPLE OF INDIA having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
[SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] and to secure to all its
citizens:
JUSTICE,
social, economic and political;
LIBERTY
of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY
of status and of opportunity;
and
to promote among them all
FRATERNITY
assuring the dignity of the individual and the [unity and integrity of the
Nation];
IN
OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY
ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.
Importance
of the Preamble
The
Preamble of the Constitution sets out the aspirations, hopes, ideals and
results anticipated to be achieved by the people via the path of the
Constitution. The preamble of the
Constitution also declares that the source of authority under the constitution
is the people of India and there is no subordination to any external
authority. Without altering the basic
structure of the Constitution, it can be amended in tune with the social
changes by adopting the procedure prescribed in the Constitution.
Rule
of Law
‘Rule of Law’ is the
supreme manifestation of human civilization and culture and is new ‘lingua
franca’ of global moral thought. It is an eternal value of constitutionalism
and an inherent attribute of democracy and good governance.
In India, concept of
Rule of Law can be traced to Upanishad. It provides-Law is the King of Kings.
It is more powerful and rigid than they (Kings). There is nothing higher than
law. By its powers the weak shall prevail over the strong and justice shall
triumph. Thus in monarchy, the concept of law developed to control the exercise
of arbitrary powers of the monarchs who claimed divine powers or rule.
In a democracy, the
concept has assumed different dimension and means that the holders of public
powers must be able to justify publically that the exercise of power is legally
valid and socially just.
The Rule of Law is a
viable and dynamic concept and, like many other such concepts, is not capable
of any exact definition. This, however, does not mean that there is no
agreement on the basic values which it represents. The term Rule of Law is used
in contradistinction to ‘rule of man’ and ‘rule according to law’. Even in the
most autocratic forms of government there is some law according to which the
powers of the government are exercised but it does not mean that there is the
Rule of Law. Therefore, Rule of Law means that the law rules, which is based on
the principles of freedom, equality, non-discrimination, fraternity,
accountability and non-arbitrariness and is certain, regular and predictable,
using the word ‘law’ in the sense of ‘jus’ and ‘lex’ both. In this sense ‘the
Rule of Law’ is an ideal. It is a modern name for natural law. In history, man
has always appealed to something higher than that which is his own creation. In
jurisprudence, Romans called it ‘jus
naturale’, Mediaevalists called it the ‘Law of God’, Hobbes, Locke and
Roussueau called it ‘social contract’
or ‘natural law’ and the modern man
calls it ‘Rule of Law’.
The basic concept of
the rule of Law is not a well-defined legal concept. The courts would not
invalidate any positive law on the ground that it violates the contents of the
Rule of the Law. However, in ADM v.
Shivakant Shukla[1],
popularly known as Habeas Corpus case, and attempt was made to challenge the
detention orders during the Emergency on the ground that it violates the
principles of the Rule of Law as the “obligation to act in accordance with rule
of law… is a central feature of our constitutional system and is a basic
feature of the Constitution”.
In Kesavanada Baharti v.State of Kerala[2],
the Rule of Law was considered as an “aspect of the doctrine of basic structure
of the Constitution, which even the plenary power of Parliament cannot reach to
amend.”
In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain[3],
in which the Supreme Court invalidated clause (4) of Article 329-A, inserted in
the Constitution by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 to
immunize the election dispute to the office of the Prime Minister from any kind
of judicial review.
A study of Kesavananda, Indira Gandhi and other Habeas
Corpus Cases, reveals a distillation of Indian Judicial thought on the
conceptions of the Rule of Law, which has evolved well over a quarter century.
The Supreme Court in
the case of P.Sambamurthy v. State of A.P[4],
categorically stated that Article 371-D (5) (Proviso) of the Constitution
clearly violates Rule of Law which is a basic structure and essential feature
of the Constitution.
This provision has
authorized the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to nullify any decision of
the Administrative Services Tribunal. Declaring the provision unconstitutional,
the court maintained that it is a basic principle of Rule of Law that the
exercise of power by the executive or by any other authority must not only be
conditioned by the executive or by any other authority must not only be
conditioned by the Constitution but must also be in accordance with law and the
power of judicial review as conferred by the Constitution.
Indian
courts have gone further to insist on specific positive content of the Rule of
Law obligations. These include the rules of natural justice which have to be
followed not just in quasi-judicial action but often also in purely
administrative action. The scope and content of the requirement of natural
justice have varied from time to time according to the judicial interpretation,
but the broad insistence remains.
The concept of ‘Rule of Law’
contains three principles:
(i)
Absence of discretionary power in the
hands of the government officials. By this Dicey implies that justice must be
done through known principles. Discretion implies absence of rules, hence in
every exercise of discretion there is room for arbitrariness.
(ii)
No person should be made to suffer in
body or deprived of his property except for a breach of law established in the
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense,
the Rule of Law implies:
a)
Absence of special privileges for a
government official or any other person;
b)
All the persons irrespective of status
must be subjected to the ordinary courts of the land;
c) Everyone
should be governed by the law passed by the ordinary legislative organs of the
State.
(iii)
The rights of the people must flow from
the customs and traditions of the people recognized by the courts in the
administration of justice.
Modern
Trends
The modern concept of
the Rule of Law is fairly wide and, therefore, sets up an ideal for any
government to achieve. This concept was developed by the International
Commission of Jurists, known as Delhi Declaration, 1959, which was later on
confirmed at Lagos in 1961. According to this formulation, the Rule of Law
implies that the functions of the government in a free society should be so exercised
as to create conditions in which the dignity of man as an individual is upheld.
During the last few
years the Supreme Court in India has developed some fine principles of Third
World jurisprudence. Developing the same new constitutionalism further, the
Apex Court in Veena Sethi v. State of
Bihar[5]
extended the reach of the Rule of Law to the poor and the downtrodden, the
ignorant and the illiterate, who constitute the bulk of humanity in India.
A conference on the
Rule of Law at Chicago described the broad areas of agreement as follows:
(i)
The Rule of Law is an expression of an
endeavour to give reality to something which is not readily expressible.
(ii)
The Rule of Law is based upon the
liberty of the individual and has as its object the harmonizing of the opposing
notions of individual liberty and public order.
(iii)
There is an important difference between
the concept of Rule of Law as the supremacy of law over the government and the
concept of rule of law as the supremacy of law in society generally.
(iv)
Although much emphasis is placed upon
the supremacy of the legislature in some countries of the West, the Rule of Law
does not depend upon contemporary positive law.
Recent aggressive
judicial activism can only be seen as a part of the efforts of the
Constitutional Courts in India to establish rule-of-law in society which
implies that ‘no matter how high a person
may be, the law is always above him’. Court is also trying to identify the
concept of rule of law with human rights of the people.
Judicial
Review
The
principle of judicial review became an essential feature of written
Constitutions of many countries including India. The essential difference
between a Government of despots and a Government of democratically elected
persons is that in the former case, there are no limitations on the powers or
their exercise whereas in the latter case, the powers are defined and their
exercise is regulated by law. In a democratic country like ours, governed by the
rule of law, the principle is, "be
thou so high the law is above you".
Judicial
review is central in dealing with the malignancy in the exercise of
administrative power. Outsourcing of legislative and adjudicatory powers to the
administrative authorities as an imperative of modern system of governance has
brought the law of judicial review of administrative action in prime focus. Law
dealing with judicial review of administrative action is largely judge-induced
and judge-led; consequently thickets of technicalities and inconsistencies
surround it. Anyone who surveys the spectrum of judicial review finds that the
fundamentals on which courts base their decision include Rule of Law,
administrative efficiency, fairness and accountability. These fundamentals are
necessary for making administrative action “people-centric”.
Judicial
review is the basic feature of the Indian Constitution and therefore, cannot be
abrogated even by an amendment of the Constitution. It is incorporated in
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as the High Courts are
concerned. In regard to the Supreme Court Articles 32 and 136 of the
Constitution embody the principle of judicial review. Article 32 is included in
Part III as a fundamental right for enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights conferred under Part III.
However,
in view of new economic policy of liberalization, privatization and
globalization courts are allowing wider flexibilities to the administration.
Trend of judicial decisions indicate that unless an administrative action is
violative of the Constitution or law or is arbitrary of mala fide, courts do
not interfere with administrative decisions. Fact remains that without a good
system of judicial review any society would collapse under its own weight making
‘development’ counterproductive.
II.
AIMS / OBJECTS
OF THE STUDY
The
following are the objectives of the study:-
1)
To understand the meaning of the
term Administrative tribunal.
2)
To look into the history and
evolution of administrative tribunals in India.
3)
To critically examine articles
323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India.
4)
To look into the working and
functioning of Administrative Tribunals in India today.
5)
To find out the reasons for the
controversy over the scope and jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals in India
6)
To suggest ways and means to
improve the Tribunal system in India in adjudication of disputes in regard to
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services
and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any
local or other authority
7)
To give reasons for the suggestions
based on empirical research.
III.
SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE TOPIC OF RESEARCH
Access
to justice
The
Indian Constitution guarantees justice to all. All Indian citizens are
guaranteed equal rights of life and personal liberty, besides many other
fundamental rights. The Constitution of India through article 14 guarantees
equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. Article 39A of
the Constitution mandates the State to secure that the operation of the legal
system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity, and ensure that the
same is not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
Equal opportunity must be afforded for access to justice. It is not sufficient
that the law treats all persons equally, irrespective of the prevalent
inequalities. But the law must function in such a way that all the people have
access to justice in spite of economic disparities. The expression “access to justice” focuses on the
following two basic purposes of the legal system:
1) The
system must be equally accessible to all.
2) It
must lead to results that are individually and socially just.
Traditional
concept of "access to justice"
as understood by common man is access to courts of law. For a common man a
court is the place where justice is meted out to him/her. But the courts have
become inaccessible due to various barriers such as poverty, social and
political backwardness, illiteracy, ignorance, procedural formalities and the
like.
To
get justice through courts one has to go through the complex and costly
procedures involved in litigation. One has to bear the costs of litigation,
including court fee and, of course, the lawyer’s fee. A poor litigant who is
barely able to feed himself will not be able to afford justice or obtain legal
redressal for a wrong done to him, through courts. Further a large part of the
population in India is illiterate and live in abject poverty. Therefore, they
are totally ignorant about the court-procedures, are terrified and confused
when faced with the judicial machinery. Thus, most of the citizens of India are
not in a position to enforce their rights, constitutional or legal, which in
effect generates inequality.
It
is one of the most important duties of a welfare state to provide judicial and
non-judicial dispute-resolution mechanisms to which all citizens have equal
access for resolution of their legal disputes and enforcement of their
fundamental and legal rights. Poverty, ignorance or social inequalities should
not become barriers to it. The Maneka Gandhi[6]
principle, as enunciated by the Indian Supreme Court, that fundamental
rights do not constitute separate islands unto themselves but constitute a
continent ushered in what Krishna Iyer, J. terms the jurisprudence of access to
justice. He said:
"We should expand
the jurisprudence of Access to Justice as an integral part of Social Justice
and examine the constitutionalism of court-fee levy as a facet of human rights
highlighted in our Nation's Constitution. If the State itself should travesty
this basic principle, in the teeth of Articles 14 and 39A, where an indigent
widow is involved, a second look at its policy is overdue. The Court must give
the benefit of doubt against levy of a price to enter the temple of justice
until one day the whole issue of the validity of profit-making through sale of
civil justice, disguised as court-fee is fully reviewed by this Court"[7].
Article
39A, as noted above, provides for equal justice and free legal aid. The said
article obligates the State to in particular provide free legal aid, by
suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to promote justice on the
basis of equal opportunity. Article 39A puts stress upon legal justice. The
directive requires the State to provide free legal aid to deserving people so
that justice is not denied to anyone merely because of economic disability. The
Supreme Court in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra[8]
as emphasized that legal assistance to a poor or indigent accused arrested
and put in jeopardy of his life or personal liberty is a constitutional
imperative mandated not only by article 39A but also by articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution. In the absence of legal assistance, injustice may result.
Every act of injustice corrodes the foundation of democracy and rule of law.
Article 39A makes it clear that the social objective of equal justice and free
legal aid has to be implemented by suitable legislation or by formulating
schemes for free legal aid.
Though
Article 39A was introduced in the Constitution in 1976, its objective of
providing access to justice could never have been fulfilled but for the
majestic role played by the Supreme Court in ‘Public Interest Litigation Movement’. This is a movement whereby
any public-spirited person can move the Court for remedying any wrong affecting
the public. This is a significant step by the Supreme Court in giving access to
justice to the people belonging to the lowest strata of society. Further, it
was only through cases filed in public interest that the Supreme Court was able
to encourage legal aid service to poor and indigent persons. Through public
interest litigation the courts are able to deal with poor people suffering from
injustice and exploitation, such as, bonded labour, dalits, women, children,
physically challenged, mentally challenged and so on.
Large
population, more litigation and lack of adequate infrastructure are the major
factors that hamper our justice system. Regular adjudication procedures through
the constant efforts of Legal Services Authorities will act as catalysts in
curing these maladies of our system.
Time
has come to think of providing a forum for the poor and needy people who
approached the law courts to redress their grievance speedily. However, the
delay in disposal of cases in law court, for whatever reason it may be, has
really defeated the purpose for which the people approach the courts for their
redressal. Justice delayed is justice denied and at the same time justice
hurried is justice buried. So, one has to find out a via media between these
two to render social justice to the poor and needy who want to seek their
grievance redressed through Law Courts.
The
Constitutional promise of securing to all its citizens justice - social,
economic and political as promised in the Preamble of the Constitution cannot
be realised unless the three organs of the State i.e. legislature, executive
and judiciary join together to find ways and means for providing to the Indian
poor equal access to its justice system.
The
judiciary has tried to do this through Public Interest Litigation movement, but
this movement has now lost much of its momentum. The executive is balking at
enforcing the courts’ orders in Public Interest Litigation cases. The persons
undertaking PIL cases are misusing the opportunity provided or they are not
able to fully utilize the opportunity.
Interaction
between the three wings of the Government is necessary to improve the justice
delivery system and such co-operation should be seen in day-to-day dispensation
of justice. Sessions trials in several Courts in the country are held up
because of unwanted adjournments on just asking either by the defence counsel
or Public Prosecutor, not examining the witnesses within the scheduled time and
the non-cooperation of the prosecuting agency. There is a general complaint
that the Police has no sufficient time or force, to serve in time the summons
on the witnesses and keep the under trial prisoners present in the Court, at
the time of trial. There are instances coming to light that the offenders are
sentenced but sentences imposed, are not executed because the convicts had
already jumped bail and the police has no will and time to search them out.
It
is not uncommon for any criminal case to drag on for years. During this time,
the accused travels from the zone of "anguish" to zone of
"sympathy". The witnesses are either won over by muscle or money
power or they become sympathetic to the accused. As a result, they turn hostile
and prosecution fails. In some cases, the recollection becomes fade or the
witnesses die. Thus, long delay in courts causes great hardship not only to the
accused but even to the victim and the State. The accused, who is not let out
on bail, may remain in jail for number of months or even years awaiting
conclusion of the trial. Thus, effort is required to be made to improve the
management of the prosecution in order to increase the certainty of conviction and
punishment for most serious offenders. It is experienced that there is
increasing laxity in the court work by the police personnel, empowered to
investigate the case.
Judiciary
today is more deserving of public confidence than ever before. The judiciary
has a special role to play in the task of achieving socio-economic goals
enshrined in the Constitution while maintaining their aloofness and
independence; the Judges have to be aware of the social changes in the task of
achieving socio-economic justice for the people.
The
Indian Judicial system is constantly exposed to new challenges, new dimensions
and new signals and has to survive in a world in which perhaps the only real
certainty is that the circumstances of tomorrow will not be the same as those of
today. The need of the hour is to correct misconception about the Judiciary by
making it more accessible and more explicit, by utilizing the resources
available to improve the service to the public, by reducing delays and making
courts more efficient and less daunting.”
At
the National Seminar on ‘Delay in Administration of Criminal Justice System’
held at New Delhi on 17 March, 2007, the Chief Justice of India, in his
Presidential Address observed:
“The
criminal justice system in the country is designed to protect the citizens of
this country from the onslaught of criminal activities of a section of the
community which indulges in such acts. The outcome of any criminal justice
system must be to inspire confidence and create an attitude of respect for the
rule of law. An efficient criminal justice system is one of the cornerstones of
good governance. When we think of criminal justice system it consists of the
police, prosecuting agency, various courts, the jail and the host of other
institutions connected with the system. The State as a guardian of fundamental
rights of its citizens is duty-bound to ensure speedy trial and avoid
excessively long delays in trial of criminal cases that could result in grave
miscarriage of justice. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible. But,
unfortunately, there are a large number of cases pending in various courts.
Various factors contribute to large pendency of criminal cases in the
subordinate courts. Speedy trial of criminal cases should be recognized as an
urgent need of the present judicial system in order to decide the fate of lakhs
of litigants. It will help enhance the faith of general public in the present
judicial system. In order to have a strong socio-economic system, it is
important that each and every state of trial of an accused should move at
reasonably fast pace…. Speedy trial ensures that a society is free of such
vices. The new system of plea bargaining incorporated in the Criminal Procedure
Code shall be available to the under-trial prisoners and the court and the
prosecuting agency and the lawyers should make them aware of the benefits of
the benevolent provision incorporated in our statute.
The
challenges before the criminal justice system are to balance the rights of the
accused while dispensing speedy and effective justice. The criminal justice
system machinery must also meet the challenge of effectively dealing with the
emerging forms of crime and behaviour of the criminals.
On
many occasions, delay in the process of trial is caused by the accused
themselves. The accused know that any delay in trial would only help him as the
memory of the witnesses is likely to be blurred by the passage of time.
In
the trial of criminal cases a Judge should be a little more active and he can
contribute to a great extent in preventing the delay in the administration of
justice. On many occasions the Sessions Judges adjourn the cases for long
period and the delay is thus caused and many witnesses who would have supported
the prosecution case lose interest in the case and often forget the ethical
duty cast on them. In most of the cases, the blame for delay in administration
of criminal justice system is put at the door of the courts. Courts are over
congested with petty cases and many legislations are being enacted which result
in filing of large number of cases before the courts. Inclusion of additional
forms of crime, for example, Section 138 cases under the Negotiable Instruments
Act or Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code, contributed a large number of
cases in the criminal courts. Some of the new legislations like Domestic
Violence (Prevention) Act, have come up and contributed some more cases to the
criminal courts. To deal with these types of cases we do not have additional
number of courts, we do not have additional infrastructure.
In
many States sufficient budgetary provisions are not made for improving the
infrastructure of the subordinate courts, including additional improvement of
existing courts, court complexes. We require modernization and computerization
of our criminal justice system. In many States courts are functioning from
rented places. The building which was constructed for the purpose of residence
is being used to house courts. There should be sufficient sitting arrangement
for the witnesses or the clients. There should be suitable building for the
proper functioning of the courts. The prosecuting agency should be given
sufficient facilities for the court to conduct the cases. The accused and the
witnesses should have resting rooms if the trial has become lengthy. All this
could be provided only if there are courts with modern facilities. The States
should gradually improve the infrastructure and there must be sufficient budgetary
allocation in each year. Now the courts are provided only with budgetary
allocation for the payment of salaries of staff members of the courts and for
day to day expenses for running the courts. This situation could be changed, if
sufficient funds are allocated every year for starting new courts and also to
improve the conditions of the existing courts. The starting of Fast Track Courts
have helped to a great extent in disposing of the pending Sessions cases and
that, by itself, has proved that it is because of lack of large number of
courts that the pendency of criminal cases is on the rise.”
Right to fair and
speedy trial
A
fair trial implies a speedy trial. While the Sixth Amendment to the US
Constitution expressly states that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial”, our Constitution does not
expressly declare this as a fundamental right. The right to a speedy trial was
first recognized in the first Hussainara Khatoon case[9].
In Surinder Singh v. State of Panjab[10],
the Supreme Court held that a speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and
content of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Hussainara Khatoon case,
the Supreme Court directed that all under trial prisoners against whom
charge-sheets had not been filed within the limitation-period should be
released. The Court observed in the second Hussainara Khatoon case[11]
that the State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide for a
speedy trial by pleading financial or administrative inability. Directions were
issued for taking positive action, like setting up new courts, providing more
staff and equipment to courts, appointment of additional judges and other
measures calculated to ensure speedy trial.
Subsequently,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of speedy trial in
many cases viz., State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal[12]; Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar[13]; State
of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah; S. Guin V. Grindlays Bank[14]; Sheela
Barse v. Union of India[15]; Raghubir
Singh v. State of Bihar[16]; Rakesh
Saxena v. State[17]; Srinivas
Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh[18]; etc.,
In the case of Andhra Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran[19]
and also In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak[20],
the Supreme Court summarized 11 principles as guidelines applicable to a speedy
trial. These guidelines are only illustrative and not exhaustive. They are not intended
to operate as hard and fast rules or be applied as a straitjacket formula. This
decision was held to be correct in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka[21].
The
speedy trail is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Any
delay in expeditious disposal of criminal trial infringes the right to life and
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The debate on
judicial arrears has thrown up number of ideas on how the judiciary can set its
own house in order. Alarmed by the inordinate delay in disposal of the backlog
of cases, it has been decided to introduce Fast Track Courts. Thus, Fast Track
Courts are to tackle the cases of under trials first, as the graph of such
persons in jail has gone high. It is high time to restore the confidence of
people in this country in judiciary by providing speedy justice.
Fair
trial obviously would mean a trial before an impartial judge, a fair prosecutor
and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or
prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses or the cause which is being
tried is eliminated. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or
the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law[22].
In India, administrative adjudication
increased after independence and several welfare laws were promulgated which
vested the power on deciding various issues in the hands of the administration.
These quasi-judicial powers acquired by the administration led to a huge number
of cases with respect to the manner in which these administrative bodies
arrived at their decisions. The Courts held that these bodies must maintain
procedural safeguards while arriving at their decisions and observe principles
of natural justice-their opinions were substantiated by the 14th Law Commission
Report.
The modern Indian Republic was born
as a Welfare State and thus the burden on the government to provide a host of
welfare services to the people was immense. The expansion of governmental
functions in order to discharge its above obligations generated a number of
occasions where an individual was at issue with the administration. This
necessitated the development of a system of administrative adjudication which
could better respond to social needs and requirements than through the
elaborate system of the ordinary judiciary. In order to avoid clogging the
judicial machinery with cases which would have arisen by the operation of these
new socio-economic legislations, a number of tribunals were established by the
government. The tribunals were established with the object of providing a
speedy, cheap and decentralised determination of disputes arising out of the various
welfare legislations. Another important reason for the new development is that
while the courts are accustomed to deal with cases primarily according to law,
the exigencies of modern administration require the adjudication of disputes
not only on the basis of technical questions of law but by considering policy
questions and the interests of the general public. Besides, tribunals were also
seen as bodies manned by experts who could professionally and fairly deal with
the issues at hand.
In India such tribunals were set up
immediately after independence. In fact, the most important adjudicatory function
is carried out by statutory tribunals created by the legislature to adjudicate
upon certain disputes arising from administrative decisions or to determine
issues judicially.
However, the problem of delays in
the disposal of cases and the backlog of litigation in the courts continued to
plague the credibility and effectiveness of the judiciary. To find a solution
to this problem, the Government set up the Administrative Reforms Commission in
1967. It was to examine the problem, suggests solutions and also to recommend
the suitable areas in which tribunals could be set up. The Commission
recommended the establishment of independent tribunals.
IV. RATIONALE OF STUDY
For a long time a search was going
on for a mechanism to relieve the courts, including High Courts and the Supreme
Court, from the burden of service litigation which formed a substantial portion
of pending litigation. This issue engaged the attention of the Law Commission
which recommended for the establishment of tribunals consisting of judicial and
administrative members to decide service matters.
The idea of
setting up service tribunals also found favour with the Supreme Court of India
which in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India[23]
advocated for setting up of service tribunals to save the courts from avalanche
of writ petitions and appeals in service matters. In the meantime various
States had established their own service tribunals.
Tribunals
are essentially those bodies of the Executive branch of the government who by
virtue of some statutory provision have the power and duty to act judicially in
determining disputes which come before it. Tribunals are distinct from the
ordinary courts of the land and as per Chandrakumar’s case they are not on par
with the High Courts but serve a supplemental function to the High Courts. They
are therefore subject to the writ jurisdiction of the superior judiciary and to
the power of judicial review exercisable by the superior judiciary. In most of
the tribunals appeals from their decisions lie in the High Court on substantial
questions of law.
Establishment of Administrative
Service Tribunals
There
are different types of tribunals in India, ranging from single member tribunals
to multi-member tribunals. Tribunals such as the Industrial tribunal may
consist of one or more members, and they can be appointed by the appropriate
government. The chairman of the tribunal is supposed to possess judicial
qualifications and is supposed to be or have been a judge of the High Court or
a District judge or be qualified for appointment as a High Court judge. The
other members are expected to satisfy the prescribed requirements- which are to
ensure that the members are experts and will be able to speedily and
effectively dispose of matters. The procedure to be followed by the tribunal is
prescribed by the Act and rules made there under. Though the function of the
tribunal is to adjudicate on the disputes it has only some of the trappings of
the court. It is not bound by strict rules of procedure and can take decisions
by exercising its discretion. While accepting the fact that such tribunals must
work towards furthering social justice, it has been held in J&K Iron and Steel Co. v. Mazdoor Union[24]
that tribunal cannot act beyond the scope of
the law. It can decide the dispute on the basis of the pleadings and has
no power to reach a conclusion without any evidence on record. The tribunal is
expected to hold the proceedings in public follow fair procedure and decide
disputes impartially and independently.
Thus,
the tribunals in India are:
1) Created by a statute
2) Subject to the writ jurisdiction of the
superior judiciary and to judicial review.
3) Manned
by experts and persons with judicial experience.
4) Subject to the superintendence of the
concerned High Court under Art.227
5) Decisions may be final or appealable within
the tribunal or in certain cases to the High Court.
6) Appeals
against orders of the tribunal may be heard by the Supreme Court by special
leave under Art. 136.
Thus the system of
administration justice began to establish itself as a part of the adjudicatory processes
and the organisation of administrative justice in the country. At the same time
the judiciary continued to exercise its constitutionally mandated control over
these bodies o as to ensure they did not violate any constitutional norm.
However the administration saw this as an unnecessary intrusion of the
judiciary into their activities of nation building and development.
Hence
in 1976 the issue was discussed at the Conference of Chief Secretaries and from
amongst all these discussions and the reports of the various bodies stated
above.
Legal
and constitutional changes
The Parliament passed constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 which added part XIV-A in the Constitution.
Articles 323-A and 323-B enabled Parliament to constitute administrative
tribunals for dealing with certain matters specified therein. Article 323-A
provided that Parliament may by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by
administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or
other authority within the territory of India or under the control of
Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the
government. Parliament was further empowered of such tribunals and also to
exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except that of the Supreme Court under
Article 136. Empowered by these enabling provisions of the Constitution
Parliament enacted Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for the establishment of
administrative service tribunals for deciding service disputes of civil
servants of the Centre as well as of the States which was amended in 1986.
Section 4(1) of the Act provides
for the establishment of Central Administration Tribunals. It also empowers the
Central Government to establish an administrative tribunal for any State on
receipt of such a request to establish an administrative tribunal for any State
by the State Government. Section 5 provides for the composition of tribunals
and benches thereof. According to sub-section (i) of section 5 each tribunal
shall consist of a Chairman and such number of Vice-Chairman and other members
as the appropriate government may deem fit. Section 5(2) further provides that
bench shall consist of one judicial member and an administrative member.
Section 14 of the Act confers
jurisdiction, powers and authority on the Central Administrative Tribunal in
relation to recruitment, matters concerning recruitment and all service matters
of Central civil servants.
Thereafter, Service Tribunals
started functioning from November 1985, and since then 25 years have passed. In
the mean time, we have encountered so many legal and constitutional issues.
At present there are two categories
of service tribunals, one constituted by the States under their own legislation
and the other constituted under the Central legislation, Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985. There was a third category also in which a service tribunal
had been established in Andhra Pradesh through the amendment of the
Constitution in 1976 which was abolished in 1989, while the States of Uttar
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Assam have established service tribunals under
their own laws. The State of Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra have established tribunals for their
employees under the Central legislation. A central Administrative Tribunal
(CAT) has also been established for Central Government employees. This Tribunal
works in eighteen places through its benches. Besides these, Circuit benches
are also held at other places particularly where the seat of High Court is
located.
Before
this Amendment, tribunals were under the control of the concerned High Court
and their orders were appealable in the High Court. The matters which went up
to the tribunals were also amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court
and Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 of the constitution of India respectively.
However with the insertion of Articles 323A and B, the legislature had the
power to exclude the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and
the fundamental right to move the
Supreme Court for the enforcement of Fundamental rights under Article 32 were
removed. The only appeal, which lies from the orders of these tribunals, is a
Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.
Constitutional
validity
Constitutional validity of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was challenged before the Supreme Court in S.P. Sampath v. union of India[25]
on the ground that the exclusion of judicial review of the High Court violated
the basic structure of the Constitution. Negativating the contention the court
held that no matter the judicial review which is the basic feature of
Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of High Court
another alternative mechanism of judicial review provided it is not less
efficacious than the High Court.
In S. P. Sampath Kumar [26],
the Supreme Court directed the carrying out of certain measures with a view to ensuring
the functioning of the Administrative Tribunals along constitutionally sound
principles. The changes were brought about in the Act by an amending Act (Act 19
of 1986). Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 was restored.
Constitutional validity of the Act was finally upheld in S. P. Sampath Kumar[27] subject,
of course, to certain amendments relating to the form and content of the Administrative
Tribunals. The suggested amendments were carried out by another amending Act
(Act 51 of 1987).
Thus the Administrative Tribunals
became an effective and real substitute for the High Courts.
The whole question of
constitutionality of the Administrative Service Tribunals Act, 1985 once again
came under the scrutiny of the a seven-Judge Bench of Apex Court in the
pace-setting case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India[28].
The Apex Court held that clause 2 (d) of article 323A and clause 3(d) of
article 323B, to the extent they empower Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction
of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of
jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of
articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The
Court held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles
226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is part
of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. All decisions of the
Administrative Tribunals are subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the
High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls.
In other words, the court in this
case held that Sampat Kumar was decided against the background that the
litigation before the high courts had exploded in an unprecedented manner and
therefore, alternative inquisitional mechanism was necessary to remedy the
situation. But it is self-evident and widely acknowledged truth that tribunals
have not performed well, hence drastic measures were necessary in order to
elevate their standard by ensuring that they stand up to constitutional
scrutiny. Court further held that because the constitutional safeguards which
ensure the independence of the judge of the Supreme Court and the High Courts
are not available to the members of the tribunals, hence, they cannot be considered
full and effective substitute for the superior judiciary in discharging the
function of constitutional interpretation. Against this backdrop the court came
to the conclusion that Administrative Tribunals cannot perform a substitution
role to the High Court, it can only be supplemental. Therefore, clause 2(d) of
Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323 –B of the constitution, to the
extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court
under Article 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution were held unconstitutional
and for the same reason Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
which contains “exclusion of
jurisdiction” clause was also held unconstitutional.
It was further observed by the
court that the power of judicial review of the constitutional Courts is a part
of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution which cannot be ousted.
However, service continue to be the courts of first instance in service matters
and no writ can be directly filed in the writ courts on matters within the
jurisdiction of tribunals. Though the two judge bench, one of whom must be a
judicial member, of the tribunal can determine the constitutionality of any
statutory provision yet it cannot determine the constitutionality of
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. But the exercise of this power shall be
subject to the scrutiny by the Division Bench of the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal is situated. By bringing back the Tribunal within the
jurisdiction of the High Courts the courts served two purposes. While saving
the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous
claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication by the tribunal.
The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits
which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. In view of this
decision the existing provision of direct appeals to the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution also stands modified. Now the aggrieved party
will be entitled to move the High Court and from the decision of the Division
Bench of the High Court he can move the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The court saved the constitutionality of Section 5(b) by
providing that whenever a question involving the constitutionality of any
provision arises it shall be referred to a two-member Bench, one of whom must
be a judicial member.
As a result, orders of the
Administrative Tribunals are being routinely appealed against in High Courts,
whereas this was not the position prior to the L. Chandra Kumar’s case.
215th
Report of the Law Commission of India
On
18th March 2006, the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2006 (Bill No.
XXVIII of 2006) was introduced in Rajya Sabha to amend the Act by incorporating
therein, inter alia, provisions empowering the Central Government to abolish Administrative
Tribunals, and for appeal to High Court to bring the Act in line with L. Chandra
Kumar. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel,
Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its 17th Report on the said Bill did not
subscribe to the same and as for the provision for appeal to High Court
expressed the view that the original conception of the Administrative Tribunals
be restored and appeal to High Court is unnecessary, and that if a statutory
appeal is to be provided it should lie to the Supreme Court only.
In
the above backdrop, the Law Commission took up the study on the subject sue motto.
The Administrative Tribunals were conceived as and constitute an effective and
real substitute for the High Courts as regards service matters. Moreover, the
power of judicial review of the High Courts cannot be called as inviolable as
that of the Supreme Court. The very objective behind the establishment of the
Administrative Tribunals is defeated if all the cases adjudicated by them have to
go before the concerned High Courts. If one appeal is considered to be a must,
an intra-tribunal appeal would be the best option, and then the matter can be
taken to the Supreme Court by way of special leave petition under article 136.
Therefore,
the Law Commission is of the view that L. Chandra Kumar’s case needs to be
revisited by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court or necessary and appropriate
amendments may be effected in the Act in accordance with law and recommended to
the Government accordingly while forwarding its 215th Report (Titled L.
Chandra Kumar be revisited by Larger Bench of Supreme Court) on 17th day of December,
2008.
V.
HYPOTHESIS
The frame work
of hypothesis is based on the following jural postulates:
1)
The Constitution of India aims at
the establishment of a Sovereign, Socialistic, Secular and Democratic Republic.
2)
Democracy would be successful only
if there is an independent judiciary capable of expeditious disposal of cases,
thereby ensuring the speedy and quick justice.
3)
Right to information of a citizen
is an integral part for the success of democracy.
4)
The Tribunals must derive the Power
of adjudication from a statute or statutory rule.
5)
It must possess the trappings of a
court and thereby be vested with the power to summon witnesses, administer
oath, compel production of evidence, etc.
6)
Tribunals are not bound by strict
rules of evidence.
7)
They are to exercise their
functions objectively and judicially and to apply the law and resolve disputes
independently of executive policy.
8)
Tribunals are supposed to be
independent and immune from any administrative interference in the discharge of
their judicial functions.
9)
The powers of judicial review on
legislative action vested in the Supreme Court and High Court under Art.32 and
226 from part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
10)
The power of High Courts under
Art.227 to exercise superintendence on all courts and tribunals under its
jurisdiction is also basic to the constitution and therefore even if tribunals
are allowed the power to perform judicial review, they may do as substitutes to
the High Courts but not in a supplementary role.
11)
Though tribunals may act as courts
of first instance for the areas they are dealing with, they are subject to the
appeal jurisdiction of a Division Bench of the High Court under whose
jurisdiction they fall.
12)
Though tribunals can examine the
Constitutionality of statutes, the power does not extend to the parent statute
under which they are constituted.
13)
In order to supervise the administration of
tribunals and to increase their efficiency an independent agency has to be set
up and till then a nodal Ministry has to see to these aspects.
VI. METHODOLOGY
As is well-known at the present day, a research scholar cannot depend
upon any one particular method for the preparation of a thesis. A combination
of different methods is required to achieve the best possible results. Thus a
Historical-cum Analytical method has been applied mainly in the preparation of
the present work. Where ever necessary, comparative and critical methods also
are employed to have a detailed study of the subject under consideration.
VII.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The required materials for the thesis have been
collected mainly by applying the doctrinal approach. This approach deals with
formal sources of law like legislation, case law, text books, articles etc. It
is basically textual in approach as contrasted to non-doctrinal approach which
is primarily contextual in nature. In the preparation of this thesis, by
adopting the above-mentioned technique, data have been collected from various
enactments, Research publications/ and Reports of the Law Commission of India, Administrative
Reforms Commission, land mark judgments of Supreme Court, High Courts, also
cases decided by the Courts, Authoritative Text Books, etc.
VIII.
CHAPTERISATION
The
thesis is divided into 6 chapters as under:
Chapter
– I
Introduction: In this chapter an outline of the scheme of research intended for the
thesis is brought out. The objectives of
the study, methodology, sources of information are also discussed in this
chapter.
Chapter
– II
The evolution and Establishment of
Administrative Service Tribunals in India: This chapter deals with the
evolution of the tribunal system in India leading up to the insertion of
Articles 323A and 323B into the Constitution. The researcher also discusses the
issues like (i) Whether the power of High Courts to exercise the powers of
superintendence over the subordinate judiciary under Articles 226 and 227 form
part of Basic Structure (ii) The competence of the tribunals to determine
the constitutionality of any law (iii) And also whether the tribunals are
acting as affective substitutes to High Courts in terms of efficiency.
Chapter
– III
Status and Functioning of Tribunals
in India: In this chapter the
relevant constitutional and legal provisions as regards
tribunals in India including the Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution and
the working and functioning of Administrative Tribunals have been discussed in
detail. Further, this chapter also covers the aspect of judicial review.
Chapter
– IV
Judicial
Interpretation: In this chapter, the researcher highlighted relevant
judgments of the Supreme Court, High Courts and Tribunals. Also certain issues
of legal importance have been focused.
Chapter
– V
Legal
& Constitutional Reforms: In this chapter reforms needed in strengthening the working of the
Administrative Tribunals in tune with the Social, Economic, political Changes. While
doing so, our past experiences especially after the Independence and the
experiences of the developed Nations are taken into consideration.
Chapter – VI
Conclusion
& Recommendations: In the
last chapter, a brief summary of the thesis to ensure the effective functioning of Administrative
Tribunals and to
achieve the object of the Act i.e., to
reduce the burden of courts and also to provide speedy relief to the aggrieved
public servants. A
set of major findings and observations, together with recommendations of the Researcher are furnished below:
1) The
impression that the Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1985 may be dependent
upon the Government is misconceived. The functioning of the Tribunal is not at
all controlled by the Government, in any manner whatsoever. The Chairman, Vice-
Chairmen and Members – Judicial/Administrative, are discharging their duties
similarly as are being discharged by higher judiciary in the country. However,
to allay the apprehension that the Tribunal may be controlled in certain
matters by the Government, the Chairman of the Tribunal can be given powers akin
to that of Chief Justice of a High Court. In that connection, a provision in
the Act of 1985, similar to the one as article 229 of the Constitution, with
regard to laying down conditions of service of employees of the Tribunal can be
vested with the Chairman. More independence in financial matters, as enjoyed by
the Chief Justice of a High Court can be vested with the Chairman of the
Tribunal. Nodal Ministry for the Tribunal can be Ministry of Law and Justice,
instead of Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
2) The
issue as to the an impression that there has to be at least one appeal provided
against the orders passed by the Tribunal before the matter may reach the
Supreme Court, intra-tribunal appeal, similar to the one provided in every High
Court either by way of letters patent appeal or a writ appeal, can be provided
under the Act of 1985 itself. By way of suitable amendment thus brought about
in the Act of 1985, a provision for intra-tribunal appeal can be made so that
an order passed by a single Member Bench would be amenable to appeal before a
Division Bench, and the decision of a Division Bench can be challenged before a
Bench consisting of three or more Members. Four zones in the country, viz.,
North, East, West, and South, can be made where the appeals from various
Benches may be filed. This may only involve creation of, at the most, eight to
ten posts of Members in the Tribunal. After the decision recorded by an
appellate Bench, the matter can be taken to the Supreme Court by way of special
leave petition.
3) A Judge, sitting or retired, is eligible to be
appointed as Chairman in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of the
Act of 1985. However, by tradition and practice, considering the importance of
functions entrusted to the Tribunal, a Chief Justice of High Court, sitting or
retired, is appointed as Chairman. A suitable amendment in section 6 of the Act
of 1985 can be made to make only a sitting or former Chief Justice of High
Court or Judge of the Supreme Court to be qualified for appointment as
Chairman.
4) The Parliamentary Standing Committee expressed
the view:
“….May be, a retired judge of the
Supreme Court can preside over. And, maybe, other member could be from the
judiciary; not from the district judges, but from the level of High Courts, we
can keep one. And, then, the third and fourth members can be from the
administration so that the dignity and strength of the tribunal is enhanced to
that extent.”
The
views expressed by the committee may be kept in view in making the changes in Law.
5) In
view of the recommendations of the Law Commission (made vide its 215th
report), the subject definitely requires the attention
of the Government of India and the State Governments and that the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar’s case requires reconsideration
by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the interest of the government
servants, both Central and the State, to achieve the object of the Act, namely,
speedy and less expensive justice. If this proposal is taken up in the right
perspective, it will not only reduce the heavy expenditure by way of fees etc.
to the counsel and also the time.
6)
In the light of the above, it is urged
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court to reconsider L. Chandra Kumar’s case.
7)
Alternatively, the policy makers should
explore to effect the necessary and appropriate amendments in the
Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 in accordance with law.
Every
effort has been made to make the thesis as exhaustive and as comprehensive as possible.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[A Research proposal submitted to A P University of Law]
[This material is put online to further the educational goals of ‘Study in Law’. This material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit]
Further Readings
I Books
1)
Administrative Law-Text and Materials by
Beatson, Marthews and Elliotts- Oxford University Press, 2007
2)
H.M.Seervai: Constitutional Law of India
(in 2 volumes) 4th Edition., Universal Book Traders, New Delhi.
3)
H.W.R. Wade Administrative Law, 7 edn.
1994, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
4)
J.F. Gamer: administrative Law, 5th
edn. 1979, Butterworth’s London.
5)
J.A.G. Griffith and H. Street:
Principles of Administrative Law, 4th edn. 1967, Pitman Publishing,
New York.
6)
S.A. De Smith: Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, 4th End. 1980, Stevens and Sons, London.
7)
M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain: Principles of
Administrative Law, 4th edn. 1997, wadhva and Company, Nagpur.
8)
Democracy Human Rights and the Rule of
Law, Butterworth’s, New Delhi, 2000.
9)
S.P. Sathe: Administrative Law, 6th
Edn. 1998, Butterworth’s, New Delhi
10) I.P.
Massey: Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. 1990, EBC, Lucknow.
11) K.C.
Davis: Administrative Law & government, 2nd Edn. 1975, West
Publishing Co., St. Paul Minn.
12) Judicial
Control of Administrative Action in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 3rd
edition, 2000, Butterworth’s, New Delhi.
13) David
Foulkes: Administrative Law, 5th edn. 1982, Butterworth’s, London.
14) Dr.
Abdul Rayees Khan: Administrative Law: 1st edn. 1999, K.K.
Publications, Hyderabad.
15) H.M.Seervai:
Constitutional Law of India (in 2 volumes) 4th Edition. Universal
Book Traders, New Delhi.
16) Granville
Austin: Indian Constitution-Cornerstone of a Nation, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
17) B.
Shiva Rao (ed): Farming of the Indian Constitution (in 5 volumes) Indian
Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.
18) V.N.Shukla:
Constitution of India, 9th Edition., Eastern Book Company., Lucknow,
1994.
19) V.D.
Mahajan: Constitutional law of India, Eastern Book Company.
20) O
Chinnappa Reddy: The Court and the Constitution of India, Oxford University
Press, 2010
21) Nani Palkhiwala-A Role Model, edited by Maj
Gen Niledra Kumar-Universal Law Publishing Co, 2009
22) The Constitution of India –Selective comments
by P M Bakshi, Universal Law Publishing Co.
23) Administrative
Law-Text and Materials by Beatson, Marthews and Elliotts- Oxford University
Press, 2007
II Journals, Articles and Reports
1)
Journal of Indian Law Institute
2)
Indian Bar Review
3)
All India Reporter
4)
Supreme Court Cases
5)
Landmark judgments of Indian Higher
Judiciary.
6)
Supreme Court Journal, (SCJ)
7)
Andhra Law Times
III
Legislation, Rules, Orders and Ordinances
1)
The
Constitution of India
2)
Administrative Tribunals Act,1985
3)
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment)
Act, 1986
4)
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment)
Act, 1987
5)
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment)
Act, 2006
6)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen
and Members) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2009
7)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen
and Members) Amendment Rules, 2009
8)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Staff) (Conditions of Service) Amendment Rules, 2009
9)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen
and Members) Amendment Rules, 2007
10)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Senior Principal Private Secretary) Recruitment Rules, 2007
11)
Central Administrative Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1987
IV
Newspapers and Magazines
1)
The
Hindu (Daily
Newspaper)
2)
Hindustan
Times (
Daily Newspaper)
3)
Indian
Express (
Daily Newspaper)
4)
India
Today (Weekly
National Magazine)
5)
Outlook,
(Weekly National Magazine)
6)
The
Pioneer (Daily
Newspaper)
7)
Seminar (Monthly
Journal)
8)
The
Statesman (Daily Newspaper)
9)
Times of
India (
Daily Newspaper)
10)
The
Tribune (Daily
Newspaper)
V Web-sites
1)
www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in
2)
www.lawmin.nic.in
3)
www.indlaw.com
4)
www.legalpundits.com
5)
www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com
6)
www.thehindu.com
7)
www.economictimes.indiatimes.com
8)
www.hindustantimes.com
9)
www.scj.in
10)
www.scconline.com
11)
www.commonwealthlawyers.com
12)
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com
[1] ADM v. Shivakant Shukla;
(1976) 2 SCC 521; AIR 1976 SC 1207
[2] Kesavanada
Baharti v. State of Kerala; (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
[3] Indira Nehru
Gandhi v. Raj Narain; 1975 Supp SCC 1:
AIR 1975 SC 2299
[4] P.
Sambamurthy v. State of A.P (1987) 1 SCC
362
[5] Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar ; AIR 1983 SC 339
[6]
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India;
(1978) 1 SCC 248
[7]
State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi,
AIR 1979 SC 855
[8]
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
; AIR 1983 SC 378
[9] Hussainara
Khatoon case; AIR 1979 SC 1360.
[10] Surinder
Singh v. State of Panjab; (2005) 7 SCC 387
[11] Hussainara
Khatoon case; AIR 1979 SC 1369
[12] State of
Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal; AIR 1981 SC 641
[13] Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar; AIR 1982 SC 1167
[14] S. Guin V.
Grindlays Bank; AIR 1986 SC 289
[15] Sheela
Barse v. Union of India; AIR 1986 SC 1773
[16] Raghubir
Singh v. State of Bihar; (1986) 4 SCC 481
[17] Rakesh
Saxena v. State; (1987) 1 SCR 173
[18] Srinivas
Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh; AIR 1988 SC 1729
[19] Andhra
Pradesh v. P. V. Pavithran; AIR 1990 SC 1266
[20] Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak; AIR 1992 SC 1701
[21] P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka; (2002) 4 SCC 578
[22] Zahira Habibulla
H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158 (Best Bakery case).
[23] K.K. Dutta
v. Union of India (1980)4 SCC 38: AIR 1980 SC 2056.
[24] J&K Iron
and Steel Co. v. Mazdoor Union; AIR 1956 SC 231
[25] S.P. Sampath
v. union of India; (1987)1 SCC 124.
[26] S. P.
Sampath Kumar; [26][(1985) 4 SCC
458]
[27] S. P. Sampath Kumar; (1987) 1 SCC 124
[28] L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India;(1977)3 SCC 261.
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